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1. Introduction 10 
In many developing countries, farmers’ access to credit provided by banks or special rural credit 11 
institutions has hardly been established or have fallen in disarray. Problems arise on both the demand 12 
side and the supply side.  13 
Risk-averse poor families might decide not to borrow to invest in profitable activities if there 14 
is a reasonable chance that they will be unable to repay the loan. Farm households with little or risky 15 
cash income often fall into this category. The severe financial repercussions such households face will 16 
hamper demand (Clarke and Dercon 2009).  17 
On the supply side, the administrative burden will hamper banks in developing countries from 18 
providing credit to farmers. Banks usually incur non-negligible administrative costs to manage a client 19 
account, regardless of how small the sums of money involved. Cost of processing loans, of any size, 20 
include the assessment of potential borrowers, their repayment prospects and security; administration 21 
of outstanding loans, collecting from delinquent borrowers and so on. There is a break-even point in 22 
providing small loans below which banks are reluctant to engage in a transaction. Poor farm 23 
households usually fall below this threshold. Moreover, the extremely poor collection efficiency of 24 
various credit lines has created a culture of non-repayment by farmers and this has become a major 25 
obstacle to commercial lending. Credit provision to agriculture has always been hampered by the large 26 
variation in revenues in farming, thus making it less (commercially) attractive to lend to this sector. A 27 
further constraint on such lending is the limited amount of collateral to securitize the repayment of the 28 
loan. Most poor people have few assets that can be secured by a bank as collateral. For the agricultural 29 
sector the most used collateral are land titles. Even if farm households happen to own land (which is 30 
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not always the case), they may not have effective title to it. This means that the bank will have little 1 
recourse against defaulting borrowers. Legal systems in many countries make it difficult to use land or 2 
real estate as collateral for agricultural loans and, even where this is possible, a bank may have 3 
difficulty enforcing its rights in case of default (e.g., homestead provisions in many countries’ laws 4 
make it impossible for a bank to take possession of a farmer’s principal home). Banks may also be 5 
reluctant to call in a loan because farm families would have to end their business and sending them 6 
into severe poverty. 7 
Financial engineering techniques can help by shifting the risk of lending from the farmer (a 8 
credit risk: will the farmer pay?) to the crop (a performance risk: will the crop be produced?). African 9 
farmers are exposed to a high degree of weather-related risks, especially drought, that severely affect 10 
crop yields and destabilizes their farm income. The chance of adverse weather events such as severe 11 
drought varies between 1/20 and 1/5 in semi-arid climate zones. In the event of a major covariant 12 
shock, lenders might well anticipate political pressure and forgive outstanding debt rather than cause 13 
farmland to be reposed (Carter 2012). Note that in a rural setting, demand for credit typically coincides 14 
with adverse weather conditions. The lending bodies therefore face high demand for credit at such 15 
time, as well as high risks of defaulting on earlier loans. Such shocks may well threaten the viability of 16 
the agricultural banks and rural credit operations. Covariant shocks are less of a concern for lenders 17 
which have a more diversified portfolio across regions and sectors. 18 
Smallholder farmers in Africa have, till now, limited options in managing these crop risks 19 
because of severely underdeveloped insurance markets. Insurance is an ex-ante measure to cope with 20 
crop losses by smoothening farm income. The risk of a loss is transferred from one entity to another, 21 
in exchange for a premium, and can be thought of as a guaranteed small loss (i.e. paying a premium) 22 
to prevent a large loss (e.g. loss of harvest).  23 
The goal of this paper is to provide more insight into the impact of linking crop insurance and 24 
credit. First, relevant literature of the theory and an overview of the empirical findings is elaborated 25 
on. Second, the impact of two cases, namely a credit-based insurance in Zambia and a weather index 26 
based insurance in Burkina Faso, is explored. 27 
  28 
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2. Theory of the impact of linking crop insurance and credit 1 
2.1 Theory of linking crop insurance and credit 2 
Insurance arrangements complement on-farm efforts to mitigate yield risks (Kleindorfer and 3 
Kunreuther 1999). Insurance adoption can be rationalized in the face of an uncertain future whereby 4 
risk averse individuals will place a value to transfer adverse outcomes (Smith 1968). This impact is 5 
referred to as first order insurance effect (Figure 1). Adopting crop insurance may affect the mix of 6 
crops facilitating specialisation as farmers’ need for self-insurance declines (referred to as second 7 
order insurance effect in Figure 1). Since the production plan may change, the merit of insurance 8 
cannot be assessed without considering the potential impact on the risk-efficiency of net returns from 9 
the whole portfolio of farm-specific risky prospects. 10 
Financial constraints potentially play a key role in insurance participation decisions. On the 11 
one hand, credit-constrained households may value the reduction in income volatility provided by 12 
insurance more highly, because they have less ability to smooth consumption ex post (i.e. after adverse 13 
weather event). On the other hand, at the start of the production season, when insurance purchase 14 
decisions are made, credit-constrained rural households may have limited funds available with which 15 
to purchase seeds, fertilizers, and other input materials. Even if such households are risk averse and 16 
would benefit from insurance, the shadow value of liquid assets may be extremely high at such times, 17 
making the purchase of insurance unattractive (Clarke and Dercon 2009).  Moreover, high-return 18 
economic activities typically require significant up-front investments. This factor alone increases the 19 
risk exposure of the family as a drought year means negative, not just zero, net income (Carter 2012). 20 
Credit can also be an important tool to smooth income (Anderson 2003). First, in a direct way: 21 
farm households can borrow money to purchase food or other basic necessities when they lack the 22 
income and repay once they harvest and sell their crops (referred to as first order credit effect in Figure 23 
1). Second, in a more indirect way: farm household often use credit to purchase inputs needed for 24 
farming (such as seeds, fertilizer, equipment) to enhance income from farming. Again, after the 25 
harvest they can repay their debts (referred to as second order credit effect in Figure 1). 26 
If too limited collateral is present, banks might require crop insurance to securitize the 27 
repayment of the loan. In this sense crop insurance facilitates credit to enhance income (i.e. interaction 28 
effect in Figure 1). Moreover, a common problem for banks with geographically limited loan 29 
portfolios is the threat of correlated risks that hinder the provision of credit. The presence of correlated 30 
risk poses a dual problem for lenders: (a) a disaster event implies the potential for much higher default 31 
rates among agricultural clients; and (b) additional liquidity problems as clients simultaneously draw 32 
down savings and increase demand for borrowing to cope with the disaster (Skees and Barnett 2006; 33 
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Skees, Hartell et al. 2007). The presence of crop insurance will therefor ease the credit constraints for 1 
rural lenders. 2 
 
Insurance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Impact of interlinking crop insurance and rural credit  
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 3 
Although credit and insurance have similar first order effects, they complement each other. Insurance 4 
specifically addresses risks occurring seldom but causing substantial losses, while self-insurance by 5 
using savings or credit addresses risks occurring more frequently but causing relative minor losses. 6 
Thus both insurance and credit are important tools for smoothening and enhancing income and will 7 
manifest themselves as high-return economic activities (i.e., increased input and specialization) and 8 
farm expansion.  9 
Because the insurance market is under developed, farmers in Africa usually rely on traditional 10 
self-insurance strategies that are a combination of ex ante risk mitigation strategies and ex post coping 11 
strategies. For example, they may maintain reserves of inventories and financial assets to get through 12 
hard times. These strategies not only provide limited protection against severe negative shocks, but 13 
quite often also leave remunerative but risky economic opportunities unexploited. Risk is therefore a 14 
development problem precisely because it forces small-scale farmers into self-insurance strategies 15 
(Carter 2012). Furthermore these risks hamper the development of rural financial markets in 16 
development countries. Limited access to credit makes it harder for small-scale farmers to capitalise 17 
on and move forward with new technologies and market opportunities, compounding the adoption 18 
problems for liquidity-constrained farm households (Carter 2012). On the other hand credit has costs 19 
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and also the leverage effects magnifies risk. Even quite poor people can save to build up reserves for a 1 
rainy day or for investment. A secure banking system that offers a reasonable return on savings may 2 
be all that is needed. 3 
While compelling on their own, the linking of credit and insurance potentially offers important 4 
advantages. In general, if insurance provision is planned where credit operations are present, linking 5 
these contracts will be beneficial for the sustainability of the credit schemes. Firstly, the provision of 6 
crop insurance protects farmers, at least to some extent, against the down-side financial risk of crop 7 
failure, preventing default of the farm. Subsequently, if the security is sufficient to repay the loan in 8 
the event of a crop failure, the lender bears lesser credit risk. Secondly, a possible mutual interest 9 
exists by optimally internalizing the different incentive, monitoring and enforcement problems (Clarke 10 
and Dercon 2009). This cost efficiency argument also holds for marketing the products. However, any 11 
resulting market power would require careful regulation, offering a crucial role for regulatory bodies 12 
for microfinance activities (Clarke and Dercon 2009). 13 
Neither credit nor insurance markets are likely to emerge independently in low-collateral 14 
environments, and agriculture technologies and income are likely to stagnate (Carter 2012).  Even if 15 
lenders are willing to grant loans with a no or low level of security, they will need to charge higher 16 
interest rates in order to price in the default risk as a result of harvest failure (Carter 2012).   17 
 18 
2.2 Review of empirical analysis impact crop insurance 19 
The ultimate impact of insurance and/or credit uptake can thus be measured in terms of reduced 20 
volatility (i.e. first order) and enhanced income (i.e. second order). Note that both insurance and credit 21 
have costs and the ‘first-order’ effect of both is to shift the income distribution downwardly. The 22 
benefits in terms of higher income combined with a shorter negative tail should be sufficient to 23 
compensate for these immediate costs. The attribution of the changes in indicators can be assessed as 24 
well (e.g. increment yield-enhancing inputs or level of specialisation). 25 
The ideal approach would be to measure the impact by means of a randomized controlled trial 26 
so that eventual differences between groups can be attributed to the intervention. However the bulk of 27 
empirical studies are based a post-test-only design using basis of a cross-sectional data. Moreover, 28 
research has focussed mainly on determinants of adoption rather than the impacts on adopters.  29 
In the paper by Coble et al. the farmer’s net worth (wealth) showed a significant impact on 30 
whether or not to purchase crop insurance (Coble, Knight et al. 1996). Sherrick et al. found that the 31 
size, age, off-farm income and debt-to-asset ratio were also significant determinants (Sherrick, Barry 32 
et al. 2004). In the study by Mishra et al., purchased crop revenue insurance coverage was correlated 33 
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with the value of production, soil productivity, farm diversification, hedging contracts and age 1 
(Mishra, Nimon et al. 2005). Smith and Goodwin found that crop insurance purchase was correlated 2 
with use of chemical inputs, relative risk aversion and debt-to-asset ratio (Smith and Goodwin 1996). 3 
Mishra and Goodwin (2003) showed that a purchase of crop insurance coverage was caused by 4 
education level of the farmer, age, debt-to-asset ratio, participation in government programs, value of 5 
production, soil productivity, off-farm income, indemnity, hedging contracts and type of ownership. 6 
Net farm income had a negative impact on the probability that a farmer would purchase crop  7 
insurance, implying that they would prefer to accumulate their core profits to self-insure instead of 8 
spending it on insurance (Ogurtsov, Van Asseldonk et al. 2009). 9 
Longitudinal crop insurance studies that measure the within farm performances over a long 10 
time horizon are limited. For example, O'Donoghue et al. (2009) estimate how much enterprise 11 
diversification changed in response to crop insurance uptake. Their analysis exploits farm-level panel 12 
census data to compare farm-specific changes in enterprise diversification over time. By examining 13 
diversification decisions of the same farms over time, the time-invariant unobserved individual 14 
heterogeneity was controlled. Crop insurance uptake caused a modest increase in enterprise 15 
specialisation and production efficiency. However, estimated efficiency gains were far less than the 16 
subsidies provided (O'Donoghue, Roberts et al. 2009). 17 
Empirical studies addressing the interaction between crop insurance and credit focus mainly 18 
on the correlation between insurance uptake and debt-to-asset ratio. The correlation found between 19 
these two variables does not automatically imply that insurance uptake causes more credit taken, it 20 
could also be that banks require insurance. Moreover, a pair-wise statistical relationship, based on  21 
cross-sectional or longitudinal data, is too limited to evaluate the joint effect of insurance and credit. 22 
 23 
3. Case studies impact insurance and credit 24 
3.1. Credit-based crop insurance in Zambia 25 
The case focuses on the Agrisure policy issued by the Zambia State Insurance Company (ZSIC). 26 
Although the cover is marketed via different channels we will restrict ourselves to the mainstream 27 
which is sold by the Zambia National Farmers’ Union (ZNFU). Approximately 350,000 smallholder 28 
farmers are member of  ZNFU, which represents 30% of all small-scale farming households in 29 
Zambia. The farmers have to pay an equivalent of US$ 10 as membership fee, therefore only farmers 30 
who are able to market their produce and are willing to pay for ZNFU’s services (such as market 31 
information) will join ZNFU. One of ZNFU’s objectives is that, by 2015 10% of their members (i.e. 32 
35.000 farmers) should have access to finance.  33 
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 1 
3.1.1. Coverage and deductible 2 
Up to season 2011/2012 only maize was amenable for insurance. Maize is the dominant food crop as 3 
well as cash crop in Zambia. More than 80% of Zambia’s total maize output was produced at a 4 
substantial lower cost per unit than the Food Reserve Agency (FRA) buying price per unit (FSRP/ACF 5 
and MACO, 2011). 6 
Peril covered by the Agrisure policy include damage or destruction of crops caused by natural 7 
events such as drought, lightning, flood, hailstorm and fire. In case of calamities ZSIC indemnifies the 8 
cost of inputs for which credit was obtained. The insurance company carries out pre-harvest 9 
assessments (4 per district). The agricultural inspector will write down the recommendations he has 10 
given to farmers with regards to improve farming practices. In case of a claim, the inspector will check 11 
the recommendations were implemented. The claim is not eligible if the agricultural recommendations 12 
are not followed.  13 
3.1.2. Premium 14 
In 2008 the insurance started with a premium set at 5% of the insured amount. Currently, the premium  15 
has been reduced to 4%. Premium differentiation to discriminate between exposure units more or less  16 
at risk is absent. Currently ZNFU pays for all support they provide to make this scheme functional and 17 
they are discussing how best to make this scheme self-sustainable. 18 
3.1.3. Link with credit 19 
The Agrisure policy is linked with the Lima credit scheme of the National Commercial Bank Limited 20 
(known as ZANACO) of which Rabobank has a share of 49%.  The Lima credit scheme is developed 21 
for smallholder farmers. The Lima credit scheme is demand driven having originated as a need for 22 
financial services demanded by ZNFU smallholder farmers participating under the “Core Support 23 
Program” and funded by the Governments of Finland, Sweden and Netherlands. The objectives of the 24 
Lima scheme is to provide smallholder farmers without collateral with commercial agricultural credit 25 
services based on Group Savings and Loans (GSL) approach. 26 
The Lima credit scheme targets smallholder farmers average loan sizes of US$600 –US$700, 27 
who are able to produce for the market (beyond subsistence) and practice farming as a business, or 28 
have the potential to practice farming as a business. The program target farmers, organizing 29 
themselves into groups of 10-20 farmers based on mutual trust, reputation and commodity focus. 30 
A smallholder farmer deposits 50% (of the full supply of his input requirements) in a fixed 31 
term collateral account. Interest payments on his deposit amounts 4%, which is lower than inflation. In 32 
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addition, the ZSIC Agrisure policy is mandatory and the District Farmers Associations (DFA) has to 1 
co-guarantee the loan. Input suppliers deliver on order from ZNFU to respective destinations where 2 
the DFAs management is responsible for distribution to farmers. ZANACO pays the invoice of the 3 
input supplier on confirmation of successful completion of the contract by ZNFU. When the Lima 4 
credit scheme first started, the interest rate was 26%, soon reduced to 21% and now stands at 11% 5 
(best interest rate for loan in Zambian Kwacha is currently 16%). According to the evaluators of the 6 
Lima Credit Scheme (2012) the mutual financing structure and the 50% cash collateral offered by 7 
farmers makes it much more attractive to banks to lend to smallholder farmers.  8 
The Lima credit scheme funds farmers up to 5 hectares. Nine ZNFU field facilitators are 9 
responsible to provide extension support and ensure that farmers who have received the Lima credit 10 
correctly apply the farm inputs.  11 
3.1.4. Market uptake 12 
Started in 2008/2009 season the granted credit and thus exposure by ZSIC was US$ 64,790 in two 13 
DFAs, while in 2011 this was increased to US$ 3.98 million (Table 1). Approximately 10.300 hectare 14 
has been insured in 25 DFAs. Benefiting farmers have increased from 600 to 4,723 over the same 15 
period (Figure 2). The Lima scheme has recorded a 100% recovery rate, a feature not common with 16 
agricultural loans especially among small-scale farmers (Lima Credit review, 2012). ZNFU envisages 17 
to reach 10.000 farmers in the 2012/2013 agricultural season and ultimately reaching 35.000 farmers.  18 
 19 
Table 1: Key characteristics of Lima credit and insurance scheme for maize 20 
Year Lima credit and insurance scheme  
 Credit 
(US$) 
Number of 
farmers 
Hectares DFA Yield 
(ton/ha) 
2008/2009 64,790 600 600 2 1.75 
2009/2010 643,290 1,334 2,229 15 2.50 
2010/2011 1,067,258 1,511 3,320 18 3.20 
2011/2012 3,983,871 4,723 10,300 25  
2012/2013  10,000    
2015/2016  35,000  40-50  
 21 
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 1 
Figure 2: Lima members per region in Zambia (% of total Lima members)  2 
 3 
3.1.5. Outlook and contribution of FaRMAf 4 
The success of the Lima credit scheme hinges on functioning of the markets. Initially Lima only 5 
focusse on maize production, and many farmers were selling their maize to the FRA. FRA offers high 6 
market prices, but there were problems with late payments by the FRA. Problem with these late 7 
payments by the FRA is that farmers do not have a commercial contract with them, which stipulates 8 
the payment date and penalties in case payment comes late. Yet the farmers have to pay the interest 9 
rates for their Lima loan, a fine if they reimburse late, and he may not have funds to prepare for next 10 
season. Therefore, ZNFU proposed for more flexibility in the Lima credit scheme.  11 
ZNFU has received funding from the Finnish embassy for a four year expansion program (starting in 12 
2012) during which it will: 13 
1 • Expand the scheme from the current 25 DFAs to 40-50 DFAs. This will lead to increase in 14 
small-scale farmers accessing Lima credit to 35,000 (at least 35 % female farmers). 15 
2 •  Incorporate into the Lima other field crops, livestock, vegetables and asset finance. 16 
3 • Create more competitive financial service packages for small-scale farmers that not only 17 
provide  access to seasonal credit but also provide access to short, medium & long term inputs & 18 
asset finance. 19 
4 • Enhance the ZNFU Lima development and management capacity through establishment of 20 
Lima development at ZNFU HQ level and strengthening Lima support capacities at DFA and IC 21 
levels. 22 
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 5 • Leverage the 50% Lima farmer deposit (US $ 1.8 million in the current 2011/12 season) for 1 
more competitive Lima loan provision by the private sector financing institutions, to expand the 2 
number of Lima financial services partners beyond ZANACO.  3 
The FaRMAf team supports the Lima scheme and the aforementioned expansion plans. The FaRMAf 4 
budget can be targeted to the following specific elements (the high-level description is ordered from 5 
research activities to more capacity building activities): 6 
Action 1 • Reviewing the risk-adjusted cost of borrowing to determine the true cost of Lima credit 7 
with the insurance option, so ZNFU and other farmers' organisations have an objective basis for 8 
negotiating with the banks and insurance companies. A more competitive Lima loan provision by 9 
the private sector financing institutions might not only manifest itself in lower interest rates but 10 
also lower cash deposits requests. 11 
Action 2 • Quantifying the impact of the Lima scheme and modalities of it. As the Lima scheme is 12 
to be rolled out to another 15-25 DFA’s starting this year, it provides opportunities to monitor & 13 
evaluate the impact that access to the comprehensive Lima scheme has. To this end, 14 
implementation in the new DFA's could be done with randomized assignment of the Lima scheme 15 
to DFAs within the eligible regions. This provides for 'treatment' and 'control' groups. 16 
 In addition, and subject to discussion with the Lima-organizers, the modalities of the scheme 17 
can be modified so as to test their effectiveness. Hence, the intervention is multi-dimensional and 18 
any assessment of it should account for this. The Lima credit and insurance scheme can be 19 
decomposed into at least five elements of which the financial contracts for obtaining credit and 20 
insurance are the most prominent ones (Figure 3). However, the scheme also collectively negotiates 21 
and supplies seed and fertilizers to its participants. Moreover, agricultural inspectors recommend 22 
participants to optimise their farming practices. Finally the scheme is a group-based model thereby 23 
reducing transaction costs and utilised peer pressure in order to maximise loan recovery. 24 
 Quantifying the attribution of the individual elements is even more challenging than 25 
quantifying the overall impact of the scheme. A full-factorial design to determine the additive and 26 
interactive effects would require 25 =32 experiments. The evaluation of all possible profiles by 27 
experiments would be an extensive task, if possible at all. Since the insurance decision is not a 28 
voluntary option within the ZNFU scheme, we propose to evaluate the option of providing pre-29 
harvest assessment without Lima (Figure 3). Other suggestions to design a set-up in which the 30 
farmer is insured without the link to credit, or the farmer can take Lima-credit without the link with 31 
insurance are difficult to implement since the market (i.e. farmers and banks) will be reluctant to 32 
participate. 33 
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The impact of group credit could be an interesting option as a case of collective action (in this 1 
way this part of the FaRMAf project will be linked with the efforts being made to develop and/or 2 
evaluate the other systems in another part of the FaRMAf project). 3 
For efficiency reasons the control group comprising farmers without Lima uptake are also the 4 
control group to evaluate the other systems in another part of the FaRMAf project. 5 
Intervention 
 
Trial Impact 
 
Control 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Impact assessment of Lima credit and insurance scheme in Zambia 
(dashed trials are optional) 
 
 
 
 
Insurance 
 
Income smoothening 
- reduced yield volatility 
- reduced income volatility 
 
Income enhancing 
- increased yield per unit area 
- increased area in production 
 
Enhanced seed 
and fertilizer 
Pre-harvest 
assessment 
 
Peer pressure 
 
Lima  
members 
 Credit 
 
Only pre-
harvest 
assessment 
without lima 
Lima  
without group 
credit 
Loan recovery 
No Lima  
members 
 
Collective action 
impact 
6 
Action 3 • The Lima Scheme is currently facilitating the production of maize. This implies that if 7 
the government exits the grain market with its substantial price support the economics of 8 
participation in the scheme may change. This means there is need to pursue the options to expand 9 
to include other commodities, namely soybean and other beans (which is already being 10 
considered). Moreover the access to innovative marketing systems should be promoted such as the 11 
WRS and exchange (in this way this part of the FaRMAf project will be linked with the efforts 12 
being made to develop the two systems in another part of the FaRMAf project). 13 
Action 4 • Besides budget to monitor the impact of Lima, also capacity building activities need to 14 
be pursued. The ZNFU Lima development and management capacity could be enhanced through 15 
establishment of a “Lima development Office” at ZNFU HQ level. The “Lima development 16 
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Office” should handle all credit and insurance issues in close contact with banks and insurance 1 
companies. Since ZNFU should be flexible to expand the number of Lima financial services 2 
partners beyond ZSIC and ZANACO it is essential that ZNFU has this capacity in-house. 3 
Moreover,  Lima support capacities of extension officers at DFA’s could be strengthened. 4 
Action 5 • Strengthening farm lobby by ZNFU with respect to a wide range of agricultural policies 5 
which ultimately improve access to credit (possible linked with insurance). 6 
 7 
3.2. Index-based insurance in Burkina Faso   8 
PlaNet Guarantee initiated a project to develop index based insurance in four WAEMU countries, 9 
including Burkina Faso. PlaNet Guarantee is setting up the first regional management platform 10 
dedicated to index-based insurance, which is based in Senegal with satellite branches in other 11 
countries in West Africa. The project will establish partnerships with local insurance companies and 12 
international reinsurers. In the short term, the project aims to contribute to improved access to finance 13 
for farmers and in the long term to improve food security. An index based insurance contract can 14 
present a significant economic efficiency in Burkina Faso (Berg, Quirion et al. 2009). 15 
The technical partners are Allianz Africa for insurance, CVECA and MECAP for credit, 16 
EARS for satellite tracking indices and Swiss Re for reinsurance. In Burkina Faso, 6 micro finance 17 
institutions market the PlaNet Guarantee cover in 2011/2012. 18 
The main activities focus on (1) coordination with financial and technical partners, (2) 19 
engineering design of the tool insurance, (3) training organization, and (4) supporting insurance 20 
uptake. This experience is financially supported by OXFAM (2011-2015), the World Bank via the 21 
Global Index Insurance Facility (GIIF), a program of the International Finance Corporation (IFC) 22 
launched in 2009 (2011-2015) and the foundation AGRA (2009-2012). GIIF is funded by the 23 
European Commission, the ACP Secretariat, and the Japan Ministry of Finance. 24 
 25 
3.2.1. Coverage and deductible 26 
The pilot scheme covers drought risks in maize. Maize is selected since it requires relative high 27 
amounts of inputs and output is more volatile than for example millet and sorghum which are more 28 
resistant to drought. The system works by a combination of crop insurance and a rural credit facility. 29 
Pay-outs are triggered on basis of satellite information. The satellite index was used since because 30 
ground information with respect to rainfall was sparse in Burkina Faso. The grid size is 3 km by 3 km. 31 
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Weather index insurance is a potential tool for reducing weather risk in agriculture. The 1 
payouts for index insurance relate to specific weather events which is in Burkina Faso the decadal 2 
relative evapotranspiration. The index value is indirectly assessed by remote sensing (EARS method). 3 
Triggers below which payments are made correspond to percentile 5% of historical long-running 4 
decadal relative evapotranspirations data. Threshold for full payment is adjusted depending of areas 5 
and crop development period. Yet payouts are dependent on three specific periods mimicking the 6 
different stages of maize production (contract of 2012). The first stage covers 30 days after seeding 7 
(1st of July), the second stage comprises 20 days and the last stage 40 days (in total 100 days). Payouts 8 
proportionally to the total covered amount for the three subsequent stages are 30%, 100% and 100% 9 
respectively.  10 
3.2.2. Premium 11 
Producers pay a premium of 10.80% of the loan amount requested for 2011/2012, while premium for 12 
2010/2011 amounted 9.40%. This includes an insurance tax of 8%. The premium is not differentiated 13 
between covered zones and regions, but each zone and region has its specific threshold level (and thus 14 
actuary fair). This implies that protection levels are better in the South. 15 
3.2.3. Link with credit 16 
The credit agency insures their portfolio of loans whereby the lenders sign in addition to the loan 17 
contract an accompany insurance contract. The payouts are made via the credit agency but is withhold 18 
if the credit is not returned. It is important to note that there is still basis risk under this linked contract 19 
(Carter 2012). Although the insurance contract is optional the credit agency are becoming more 20 
stringent in requesting this cover. Insured farmers without credit are rare in Burkina Faso, only one 21 
individual experience has been reported.  22 
3.2.4. Market uptake 23 
It was launched by a pilot with 194 maize producers during the 2010/2011 season by PlanetGuarantee. 24 
For the next seasons, Planet Guarantee seeks to extend the experiment conducted among 10,000 25 
producers (Table 2 and Figure 4). To do this, the organization associated with the CPF as a new 26 
partner, so as to serve as a distribution channel, particularly through FEPAB which provides its 27 
network of Planet Guarantee endogenous facilitators. For subsequent seasons, Planet Guarantee aims 28 
to further expand the experience, with more producers, including new products (cotton, peanuts), by 29 
using indices yields for cotton (partnership with SOFITEX update provision of an on-going historical 30 
returns), and the inclusion of new technical partners (Coris Ecobank and Africa Re). 31 
  32 
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Table 2: Key characteristics of rural credit and insurance scheme in Burkina Faso for maize 1 
Year Credit and insurance scheme 
 Number of farmers 
2010/2011 194 
2011/2012 1,471 
After 2012 10,000 
 2 
 3 
Figure 4: Villages expected to participate participating in 2012 in the PlanetGarantee scheme in 4 
Burkina Faso 5 
 6 
The Burkina Faso project is part of a larger project whose objective is to develop parametric 7 
agricultural insurance systems in four WAEMU countries, including Senegal, Mali and Burkina Faso. 8 
This facility should cover at least 60 000 people by the end of 2015 and raise awareness to more than 9 
165 000 farmers on agricultural insurance.  10 
 11 
3.2.5. Outlook and contribution of FaRMAf 12 
The FaRMAf team supports credit schemes and insurance schemes that could facilitate credit uptake. 13 
The FaRMAf budget can be targeted to the following specific elements (the high-level description is 14 
ordered from research activities to more capacity building activities): 15 
Action 1 • Collaboration with an on-going project run by Planet Guarantee to enhance farmers 16 
access to credit. The contract for 2012 is refined in comparison to the contract in 2011, and it is of 17 
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interest to explore further refinements. High correlation between weather index shortfalls and farm 1 
yield shortfalls is an important precondition for introducing a successful weather-based index 2 
insurance to reduce farmers’ crop yield risk. An important limitation of index insurance is that 3 
policyholders are exposed to basis risk, which refers to the imperfect correlation between the index 4 
and the losses experienced by the policyholder (Barnett and Mahul, 2007). A discrepancy is that 5 
the weather variable used to drive the index may not accurately reflect the measure of the weather 6 
variable at the farm (spatial basis risk). A bias might be introduced because of intercropping of 7 
trees with maize production, affecting the evapotranspiration measured by the satellite. The 8 
analysis of rain and production data is foreseen to decrease the basis risks. Moreover, the 9 
probability of payouts is equal for all zones, although the northern regions are more drought prone 10 
that the southern zones. This implies that even with insurance the northern province are still riskier. 11 
Specific studies are foreseen to homogenize the level of protection between northern and southern 12 
zones: this could be achieved by the implementation of different premium levels (the differences in 13 
premiums could be paid by producers themselves or by public subsidies). Therefore, the CIRAD- 14 
WUR research team in line with CPF recommends to research the possibility of refining the index 15 
used in the PlanetGuarantee project. Implementing and thus designing index based contracts to 16 
cover other crops (e.g., rice, peanuts, sorghum and millet) is not yet foreseen.  17 
 18 
Action 2 • A review of risk-adjusted cost of borrowing can determine the true cost of credit with 19 
the insurance option, so farmers have an objective basis for negotiating with the banks. A more 20 
competitive loan provision by the private sector financing institutions might not only manifest itself 21 
in lower interest rates but also lower cash deposits requests. This could be investigated by the 22 
WUR research team and the results could serve as an output for CPF when negotiating better 23 
conditions with micro-finance institutions and banks. Another research element is to assess the 24 
option to change the functioning of the insurance scheme by directly insuring the credit global 25 
amount at IMF level. The latter implies that the insurance is automatically linked to credit 26 
provision and that the IMF is confronted with the basis risk. 27 
Action 3 • Quantifying the impact of credit and insurance. The credit and insurance scheme can be 28 
decomposed into two separate financial contracts (Figure 5). A full-factorial design would require 29 
22 =4 experiments. The insurance decision is a voluntary option linked with credit. The option of 30 
crop insurance without credit is seldom applied and therefore not investigated. The team there 31 
proposes to randomly select zones where the insurance will be offered and to monitor farm 32 
households in these zones as well in other, control, zones. The monitoring in the targeted zones 33 
also provides an opportunity to gauge the index and assess the basis risk that is inherent in this 34 
index-system. There could also be opportunities to differentiate the modalities of the schemes over 35 
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various zones, but this has not yet been worked out. As for now, the test is for yes/no access to 1 
index-based insurance. 2 
One of the difficulties when assessing the impact of indexed insurance on producers’ income is 3 
linked to the fact that the insurance decision is fully linked with credit in Burkina. Thus, one 4 
foreseen activity by the CIRAD-WUR research team is to rely on a stratified sample and compare 5 
three distinct groups: a control group of producers with no access to credit (and thus no insurance), 6 
a treatment group of producers with access to credit and insurance, and a group of producers with 7 
access to credit only.  8 
The impact of group credit could be an interesting option as a case of collective action (in this way 9 
this part of the FaRMAf project will be linked with the efforts being made to develop and/or 10 
evaluate the other systems in another part of the FaRMAf project). 11 
Intervention 
 
Trial Impact 
 
Control 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Impact assessment of credit and insurance scheme in Burkina Faso 
(dashed trials are optional) 
Insurance 
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- reduced income volatility 
 
Income enhancing 
- increased yield per unit area 
- increased area in production 
 
No  
credit 
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12 
 13 
For efficiency reasons the control group comprising farmers without the Planet Guarantee uptake 14 
corresponds also to the control group to evaluate the other systems in another part of the FaRMAf 15 
project (for example WRS). To conduct the impact assessment studies of both insurance and 16 
warehouse receipt systems, two administrative areas have been selected by CPF and CIRAD: the 17 
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Tuy province and the Mouhoun province. Both provinces are located in the west of the country and 1 
exhibit similar agro-pedo-climatic characteristics, cotton and maize being the main agricultural 2 
production, and maize showing a rapid production growth, with a annual average growth rate of 3 
12,4% in the last 5 years. In those two areas, baseline and follow up surveys are foreseen. 4 
 5 
Action 4 • Moreover, support capacities of CPF extension officers could be strengthened. By 6 
means of training workshops in the villages the CPF extension officers will provide information to 7 
farmers about the functioning of the index based insurance system, and about its relative 8 
advantages and shortcomings (i.e., explain the inherent basis risk). An instruction document will be 9 
accompanying this dissemination task and different communication tools could be used, as 10 
illustrated documents, videos and radio programs. Specific actions could be carried out to monitor  11 
and evaluate the level of knowledge and control of the stakeholders in the insurance scheme (i.e., 12 
farmers, micro-finance institutions, and insurance companies). This work should be led by CPF, in 13 
close relationship with the WUR-CIRAD team and PlanetGuarantee.  14 
Action 5 • Strengthening farm lobby by CPF with respect to a wide range of agricultural policies 15 
which ultimately improve access to credit (possibly linked with insurance). For example, insured 16 
farmers have to pay insurance tax. Lobbing towards abolishing insurance tax is of interest for 17 
farmers since insurance tax increases the cost of insurance. Another issue of interest in this 18 
lobbying activity is the possibility of subsidizing premiums paid by farmers, either by Burkinabe 19 
government or by a regional institution (CILSS, UEMOA, CEDEAO). This lobbying activity could 20 
be led by CPF and benefit from a collaboration with PlanetGuarantee.  21 
 22 
4. General consideration impact measurement in Zambia and Burkina Faso 23 
The two countries both offer unique opportunities for testing the impact that crop insurance and credit 24 
has on farm households. For both cases the following three elements are important to consider 1) what 25 
is measured?; 2) how often is measured?, and how many samples?   26 
 Farm structure (e.g., farm size and crops cultivated) as well as financial structure (e.g., credit 27 
amount, insurance adoption and collateral) could be elicited by means of a questionnaire. This also 28 
holds for technical variables of the farm operation (input used and yield). Moreover less tangible 29 
elements should be elicited too (e.g., motivations, risk perception and risk aversion). 30 
The measures that are collected will naturally depend on the conditions prevailing in the years 31 
to come. The need for credit (and other elements of packages) will therefore differ from year to year 32 
and from one household to the other. It might  be that the insurance actually will pay-out in one of 33 
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these years. For the evaluation of the impact of the schemes, it would be wise to monitor households 1 
on an annual basis, so as to take advantage of the then prevailing situations and be able to correct for 2 
changes in the need for the insurance and credit.  3 
To avoid high costs, a compromise can be to sample a rather large group of households in the 4 
base year (2012) and in the final year (2015), and a smaller sample out of these in the intermediate 5 
years and for a limited number of variables only. Alternatively in the intermediate years only the most 6 
essential variables could be elicited (i.e. yield), while maintaining the original sample size. It is 7 
important to aim partly for a difference-in-difference approach which requires that households are 8 
monitored (in all areas: both the treatment and the control) before the implementation of the tool and 9 
after some years of implementation. In addition and because of practical reasons, a subset of the 10 
treatment group could consist out of households which already implement the tool in the on-going 11 
cropping year. Suggestion is to sample 250 up to 500 households in each group and country. The 12 
sample size in the impact study is based on the expense of data collection, and the need to have 13 
sufficient statistical power. 14 
 15 
5. Conclusion and extensions emerging from Zambia and Burkina Faso 16 
While compelling on their own, the linking of crop insurance with rural credit potentially offers 17 
important advantages. As in above, any innovative guarantee funds scheme that reduces overall cost of 18 
borrowing as well as increase resources available to the farmers for acquiring inputs will be good for 19 
farmers to smoothen and enhance their income. The Zambia and Burkina Faso model provides a 20 
unique opportunity to test amendments of the credit-insurance-input-extension model and see how the 21 
(successful) scheme can be adapted and replicated in other countries.  22 
  23 
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